Preamble

In the summer of 2025, the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), with the endorsement of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, released a 170-page Emergency Phase Booklet aiming to guide Iran’s governance after the potential collapse of the Islamic Republic. The authors acknowledge the document as a preliminary draft and have invited feedback. The plans outlined in the Emergency Phase Booklet stirred various reactions among the opposition groups and activists, both inside Iran and in the diaspora. Particularly, proponents of constitutional monarchy in Iran deemed the Booklet as a preemptive annulment of the pre-1979 constitution of Iran and vehemently opposed it in the Persian-language mainstream media and social media. As defenders of Iran’s constitutional monarchy, we offer this critique to highlight serious concerns about the booklet’s approach, hoping the serious flaws in the Booklet will be addressed in the future drafts.

Planning for the chaotic post-regime transition is a commendable effort, and we appreciate the initiative. However, the Booklet misses the mark by preemptively discarding the 1906 Constitutional Monarchy and its amendments (henceforth the “Pahlavi Era Constitution”), Iran’s most significant historical legal framework. Crafted by NUFDI’s authors, the roadmap suffers from methodological flaws, naive approach in both political and legal aspects, and designing flawed power structures that risk chaos and could pave the way for another authoritarian regime. Our concern is that the authors’ approach undermines the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Pahlavi Era Constitution, a proven framework for stability and democratic governance, contrary to the interests of a free Iran.

We organize our critique under the following categories:
A) Critique of the Methodology Applied in Composing the Booklet
B) Critique of the Proposed Political-Legal Structure
C) Critique of the Authors’ Justifications for Discarding the Pahlavi Era Constitution
D) Proposed Alternative to the Booklet’s Roadmap
E) Conclusion 

A. Critiques of the Methodology Applied in Composing the Booklet

The booklet’s methodology is fundamentally flawed, undermining its ability to serve as a realistic guide for Iran’s post-regime transition.

1. Absence of Scenarios for Regime Collapse: The booklet plans for the aftermath of the Islamic Republic’s collapse but avoids discussing how such a collapse might occur. A credible roadmap must consider scenarios including but not limited to: 

o Internal implosion, similar to the Soviet Union. 

o Full-scale foreign invasion, similar to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 

o Airstrikes with mass protests, similar to Serbia in 1999. 

o Airstrikes with domestic guerrilla forces, similar to Afghanistan in 2001. 

o Domestic armed insurgency, as with Bashar al-Assad’s fall to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in 2024.

The authors seem to have sidestepped even considering these scenarios, as if regime change is outsourced to external forces. This omission renders the proposals unrealistic and disconnected from the realities of collapse. Scenario-based planning would be far more prudent, enabling tailored strategies for each potential outcome, such as securing borders during an invasion or managing civil unrest in a domestic uprising. Such a scenario-based approach would result in ensuring a flexible responsive framework that leverages the constitutional monarchy’s stability to address diverse risks effectively.

2. Confusion Over Time Horizons: The booklet focuses on the first 100–180 days post-collapse, yet its economic, technological, and environmental sections propose plans realistically requiring three to five years or more. For instance, promising economic prosperity or restoration of underground water tables in six months lacks credibility. This overreach suggests either an attempt to overpromise or a lack of understanding of realistic priorities and timelines. As another example, the economic section of the plan is full of confusion and contradictions, e.g., advocating both single and dual currency exchange rates without resolution. 

 3. Unrealistic Priorities and Risk Assessment: The booklet’s priorities are not grounded in the complex realities of a post-regime Iran. It overlooks critical risks such as civil war, armed uprisings, foreign invasions, or military coups, focusing instead on less urgent issues like revising textbooks for schools. This misplacement of priorities questions the authors’ grasp of a transitional government’s immediate challenges. 

4. Lack of Cohesion and Consistency: The 170-page document lacks a unified vision. It appears that the lead compiler, Mr. Saeed Ghasseminejad, outsourced each section to a different research team and collated their output without ensuring alignment in scope, priorities, or timelines. This results in a disjointed document that is overly long and lacks a coherent strategy for the emergency phase.

B. Critiques of the Proposed Political-Legal Structure

The booklet’s political-legal framework, crafted by NUFDI-selected authors, recklessly begins by unilaterally and preemptively abolishing the Pahlavi Era Constitution, replacing it with a structure that lacks historical legitimacy, is disconnected from Iran’s legal traditions, and dangerously violates the basic principle of separation of powers. Many defenders of the constitutional monarchy find this approach not only troubling but a direct assault on Iran’s proven framework for democratic governance, leading to stability and prosperity.

The authors discard the title of “Shah,” with its clearly defined constitutional role and historical precedent, and impose the alarming title of “Leader of the National Uprising” on Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. This invented title evokes authoritarian figureheads like “Fuhrer” or “Supreme Leader,” conjuring images of undemocratic regimes rather than the balanced governance of a constitutional monarchy. The authors’ motivation appears to be pandering to the faux-reformist faction of the Islamic Republic and/or anti-monarchy factions of the opposition, but they ignore the historical reality that constitutional monarchs have often governed with greater democratic accountability than self-styled “leaders” who consolidate unchecked power. Have figures like “Fuhrer” or “Dear Leader” or “Supreme Leader” proven more democratic than constitutional monarchs, as the authors’ choice of title implies? This reckless rebranding undermines the very stability that the Crown Prince represents by legacy.

The proposed structure concentrates absolute power in a “National Uprising Institution,” akin to a Revolutionary Council, with members appointed by this so-called “Leader.” Unlike the Shah under the Constitution, who could appoint and dismiss ministers during parliamentary interregnums with accountability to the law, this “Leader” is stripped of the power to remove council members, who are accountable only to themselves through internal consensus within the National Uprising Institution. This design blatantly violates separation of powers, granting the council unchecked authority to: 

• Legislate in place of a parliament, 

• Appoint and alter the executive branch (interim government), 

• Select judicial authorities,

• Oversee reorganization and restructuring of the armed forces, 

• Vet election candidates, mimicking the Islamic Republic’s Guardian Council, 

• Decide which Islamic Republic laws to retain or abolish, using the vague slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom; Man, Homeland, Prosperity” as a legal basis—a six-word phrase ripe for arbitrary interpretation.

This structure, while exploiting the legitimacy of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi through the authors’ invented title, is unaccountable to the people or the Crown Prince thereafter, mirroring authoritarian setups like the 1979 Revolutionary Council that plunged Iran into chaos. By abolishing the Pahlavi Era Constitution and imposing this title, the authors strip Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi of his constitutional standing, reducing him to a vague and symbolic figurehead. We find this to be a deliberate move that undermines the stabilizing potential of the constitutional monarchy.

This framework satisfies neither monarchists, who cherish the Constitution’s historical legitimacy, nor republicans in the opposition, who distrust an unaccountable council appointed by one individual/leader. The authors’ rejection of Iran’s legal traditions, akin to Robespierre’s radical erasure of French legal heritage, invites chaos and disorder. Unlike America’s Founding Fathers, who preserved the legal traditions post-independence to ensure stability, the booklet’s approach creates a dangerous legal vacuum, threatening Iran’s future as a democratic nation.

C. Critiques of the Authors’ Justifications for Suspending the Pahlavi Era Constitution

The booklet’s authors justify abolishing the Pahlavi Era Constitution with three arguments:
C-1. Its Islamic-Shiite provisions are unamendable.
C-2. A referendum is needed to decide the future political structure/system of Iran.
C-3. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi supports it. 

C-1. Islamic Provisions in the Constitution

The authors note that provisions like Article 2 of the Supplement to the Pahlavi Era Constitution reference Islamic-Shiite principles, which are not secular. However, these provisions were largely obsolete and unenforced, even before the Pahlavi era. The five ayatollahs/mujtahids appointed to ensure compliance of the Parliament legislations with the Sharia Law all withdrew early or opted to serve as elected representatives (as regular members of the parliament), stripping themselves of any Sharia authority, well before the 1920s. The 1906 Constitutional Revolution’s secular spirit was clear, as seen when a constitutionalist rebuked a reactionary cleric advocating for a “Sharia-based Constitution,” stating, “You embodied ox! The Constitution can’t be Sharia-based.” The trial and execution of Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri, the staunchest advocate for Sharia Law and enemy of the Constitution, for inciting murder, clearly marked the secularists’ victory.

The bitter irony is that the ideological descendants of Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri—especially those from the Office for Consolidation of Unity between Seminary and University and the faux-reformist faction of the Islamic Republic—now seek to nullify the Constitution under the label of being “Sharia-tainted”, citing obsolete provisions.

Moreover, all references to Islam and Shiism can easily be amended and secularized, especially since they were dormant and obsolete even before the 50-year Pahlavi era. The Constitution has proven adaptable through constituent assemblies, even for seemingly unchangeable provisions. The shift from Qajar Dynasty to Pahlavi monarchy in 1925 was achieved via such amendments, as was the addition of a Senate and bicameral system in the 1940s.

The single-article law passed on October 31, 1925, by the National Assembly to amend seemingly immutable provisions and change the monarchy from Qajar to Pahlavi begins:
“The National Assembly (Parliament), in the name of the prosperity of the Iranian nation, announces the extinction of the Qajar monarchy and entrusts a provisional government within the limits of the Constitution to Mr. Reza Khan Pahlavi. The final determination of governance is deferred to the Constituent Assembly formed to amend Articles 36, 37, 38, and 40 of the Constitutional Supplement.” 

As evident, the only unchangeable foundation in the 1906 Constitution is “the prosperity of the Iranian nation,”. The essence of the Constitution is that sovereignty belongs to the Iranian people. Thus, a Constituent Assembly elected by the people can amend any provision.

For those supporters who view the Islamic provisions as eternally unamendable, one must ask: By what legitimacy and authority do you propose abolishing the entire Constitution? Any entity/person with the power to abolish the whole Constitution logically has the authority to amend a few articles. Claiming you can bulldoze the entire structure but not repaint a few walls is absurd! 

This legal argument is noteworthy because the Pahlavi Era Constitution was never legally abolished—unless one accepts the sham April 1, 1979, referendum where 99% allegedly voted for an “Islamic Republic” (a concept unknown to most Iranians at the time, with no mention of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, i.e., Velayat-e Faqih). By implicitly accepting abolition of the pre-1979 Constitution, the authors unwittingly align with the Islamic Republic’s ideological heirs.

C-2. Referendum

The authors and supporters rightly insist that determining the future political system or any constitutional changes must occur via referendum. But it’s unclear how this valid point leads to the conclusion that the entire Constitution must be preemptively discarded. The Constitution doesn’t conflict with referendums—historical precedent exists. The White Revolution referendum on January 26, 1963, was held under it. Retaining the Constitution as a temporary framework post-collapse allows for referendums on the future system, amendments, or even a new constitution drafted by an elected assembly. There’s no need to hastily nullify the only existing framework in Iran (a framework that was fought for and won by the brave people of Iran)

without a replacement, plunging the nation into a legal void. C-3. The Crown Prince’s Support

The authors argue that the booklet must be accepted by the public because Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi supports it. This appeal to authority, rather than reason, contradicts Article 64 of the pre-1979 Constitution:
“Ministers cannot use the Shah’s verbal or written orders as a pretext to absolve themselves of responsibility.”
The Constitutional Movement and later the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 rejected the Qajar-era practice of hiding behind the monarch to justify shortcomings—a practice that nearly destroyed Iran in the 19th century. It is unsurprising that the Booklet’s authors seek to abolish a Constitution that demands accountability. They’ve revealed their ideal system: maximum power with minimum accountability.

Moreover, it is unclear how authors who abolish the monarchical and Crown Prince positions can then cite the Crown Prince’s legal legitimacy. It treats his authority like Schrödinger’s cat—denied yet exploited.

Even assuming they view Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as Reza Shah II with full monarchical powers (which they don’t), the question arises: Does the Shah have the unilateral authority to abolish the Constitution? In the 70-year post-Constitution tradition—under Qajars and Pahlavis from 1906 to 1979—the answer is a clear no. Neither Mohammad Reza Shah nor Reza Shah the Great ever claimed the power to alter even one article unilaterally, let alone abolish the entire constitution. Every amendment required a Constituent Assembly. The only monarch who assumed such unchecked power was Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar, who was deposed for it by the people of Iran. The authors should deepen their knowledge of modern Iranian history.

How can the heir to the Pahlavi dynasty inherit powers that Pahlavi monarchs never claimed? Legally, inheritance cannot exceed the estate. Thus, the authors must face this question: Do they see Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as heir to Mohammad Reza Shah and Reza Shah the Great, or to Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar?

As defenders of the constitutional monarchy, we believe the authors are exploiting the Crown Prince’s authority, leveraging his support to advance a flawed plan that erodes Iran’s legal heritage.

D. Proposed Alternative to the Booklet’s Roadmap

The Pahlavi Era Constitution offers a robust alternative for the post-collapse emergency. During a parliamentary interregnum, the Shah or regent can appoint an interim government to organize referendums or elections for a National Assembly or constituent assembly. Historical precedents include: 

• 1911–1914: Governments were appointed by Regent Naser ol-Molk during a three-year interregnum (while Ahmad Shah Qajar was under the legal age to rule as the monarch). 

• 1915–1921: Ahmad Shah Qajar appointed governments during a six-year interregnum during World War I.

The Constitution can unite all factions, including the proponents of a democratic republic for Iran, preventing anarchy and autocracy while ensuring rights. It enables interim governance, referendums, or a new constitution, with the prosperity of the Iranian nation as its core principle.

The Constitutional Movement and its fruit—the 1906 Constitution—represent Iranians’ greatest achievement in limiting absolute power and establishing the rule of law. Separation of powers and government accountability to the nation are its core ideals. Thus, it can prevent legal vacuum, state collapse, autocracy revival, and safeguard citizen rights post-Islamic Republic. Calling for the restoration of Pahlavi Era Constitution is not a reactionary act, nor is it regressive; it’s leveraging the existing capacity and legal tradition of Iran to protect the country in the emergency/transition phase and build a more efficient and modern structure in the future. With the Constitution, no legal void exists needing hasty booklets or pamphlets to fill.

E. Conclusion

More concerning than the Booklet’s flaws is: i) lack of meritocracy in its compilation, ii) the authors’ response to criticism.

The criteria to select the authors of the booklet are unclear, with some lacking expertise or facing allegations of ties to the Islamic Republic or its lobbies. The author(s) of the most important section in the Booklet, i.e., the political-legal section, remain unnamed, suggesting outsourcing to unnamed organisations outside NUFDI. If this approach reflects how the officials for the “National Uprising Institution” would be chosen in the future, NUFDI prioritizes mediocrity and loyalty over merit.

Even more alarming is that some authors and supporters of the Booklet, instead of embracing criticism and debating openly in the media, dismiss any fundamental criticism and adopt stances such as: “take it or leave it”, “the Crown Prince said so, shut up,” “we’ll round you up,” or “Iranians do not deserve anything better than this.”

NUFDI-affiliated figures such as Amir Hossein Etemadi and Saeed Ghasseminejad (the booklet’s main planners), opt for scripted interviews filled with soft-ball questions from sympathetic hosts, or worse, attack critics—especially veteran constitutionalists—on social media via main or anonymous astroturfed accounts. This unseemly tactic escalated to vulgar insults not just against the critics but all Iranians, or calling the 1906 Constitution “cursed”.

Governing a nation like Iran, with the population of over 90-million, especially post-collapse of a totalitarian regime like the Islamic Republic, is a monumental task, requiring a lot of maturity, humility, and a great sense of responsibility. Political activists who, before gaining any official power or responsibility, respond to criticism only with staged interviews and troll armies on social media—what solutions will they have for much more serious responsibilities such as: guarding Iran’s borders, providing security, and ensuring running electricity, water, and economic stability?

As defenders of the constitutional monarchy, we urge NUFDI to reconsider its approach and preserve Iran’s legal heritage for a stable democratic future.

Signatories

Jessica Emami
Reza Taghizadeh
Daniel Jafari
Sam Shahan
Kourosh Sabzandam
Asghar Sepehri
Ali Saadat Melli
Nima Saeedi
Mohammad Riyazat
Farzad Safavi
Khosrow Forouhar
Sharvan Fashandi
Mitra Jashni